Approved For Release 2006/08/15 : CIA-RDP78-03097A002400020033-0

19 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Operations Group
Chief, Production Group
Chief, Analysis Group
Chief, Administrative Staff
Chief, Executive and Planning Staff

SUBJECT : FBIS Affiliation

The DDI has suggested that it would be timely for us to present our ideas on the impact on FBIS of reorganization of the Intelligence Community. Here, briefly stated, are pros and cons of changing our present status along the lines we discussed with the bureau chiefs. They are listed in the order of attractiveness to FBIS as I see it. Please let me know if you disagree, and amend or expand on the pros and cons that I have listed. Also, if you have a preferred course or action, please describe it in a paragraph or two so that I can incorporate it in our report to Mr. Proctor. I would like your reply by COB Tuesday, 20 January.

1. FBIS to be part of an intelligence production group shorn of clandestine and technical components, sort of an augmented DDI organization.

PRO	CON
Continued close association with our primary analytical consumers.	As the sole collector among analysts, FBIS would be the odd ball in top managers' eyes.
A "clean" image abroad.	Unfamiliarity with overseas operation management problems on the part of our associates would make it difficult for us to sell our proposals.
A natural affinity among the officers of such a grouping would keep FBIS' morale high.	In a tug of war for resources, production offices would receive more sympathetic treatment than support elements.

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2. FBIS to become an independent U.S. Government organization.

PRO	CON
A clean name and image abroad.	We would need to provide our own support, obviously requiring a much larger organization.
Our decision-making process would be independent and clear cut.	We would have to justify our annual budgets before Congress. (Almost inevitably, we would need a sponsor, or someone to run interference for us.)
	FBIS is simply too small to operate effectively as an independent organization in the U.S. Government labyrinth.

3. FBIS to become a part of State Department.

PRO	CON
A clean image abroad.	[redacted] 25X1
We would be more acceptable to ambassadors and host governments.	
We would be close to one of our major consumers.	We might also become a holding tank for qualified Foreign Service officers assigned to the United States for whom State had no appropriate position.
We would be with an organization that could defend our budget proposals fairly well, and that understands the management problems of an overseas organization.	The influx and turbulence resulting from the above would mean a loss of professionalism.
	As a State component, we would be subject to pressures from the ambassador and other foreign service officers. Our product could be controlled to comport with their view of the "national interest."

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	In State budget crunches, we might fare as poorly as VOA and USIA.

4. FBIS to be part of a component in which all collectors--overt, covert, technical--are included.

PRO	CON
We would still be close to our key consumers, the analysts.	Association with covert activities would be fatal, unless a credible (and doubtless expensive) cover were established.
We would be with an element that understands and is sympathetic toward the problems of collection overseas.	Clandestine collection top managers have so far shown no great regard for overt collection.

5. Affiliation with a Department of Defense component.

PRO	CON
There would be many sites available overseas.	The military image itself is unpopular abroad.
We would probably have more access to funds and slots.	There doubtless would be strong military influence on our activities.
Our image would be cleansed of covert overtones.	Our monitoring probably would be tilted more toward DOD targets than community targets.

6. Commercial. The FBIS function could be filled by a commercial contract with a business corporation.

PRO	CON
Our image would be clean.	It would be very expensive. "FBIS" would lose our non-commercial communications links. It would lose our free rent on Government sites.

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Overseas, "FBIS" would be subject to political restrictions by host governments.

Reliance on local communications would make "FBIS" vulnerable during local crises.

"FBIS" would lack easy access to classified consumers.

STAT

[redacted]

Deputy Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Distribution:
1 - Each addressee listed
1 - FBIS Exec. Reg.
1 - D/FBIS File

STAT [redacted]

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Associate Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
Room 7E13, Headquarters

Hank -

Thanks for the loan.

STAT

Director, FBIS

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Attachment: Draft Report to the President on
Organization and Management of the
Foreign Intelligence Community, 16 Dec 75
(I/R-75/S-665).

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